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Abstract
We present an auction-based algorithm for computing market equilibrium prices in a production model, in which producers
have a single linear production constraint, and consumers have linear utility functions. We provide algorithms for both the Fisher
and Arrow–Debreu versions of the problem.
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1. Introduction
Two basic models of market equilibria, consisting of buyers and goods, were defined by Fisher [2] and Walras [20]
in the 19th century. The celebrated paper of Arrow and Debreu [1] introduced a general production model and gave
proofs of existence of equilibria in all these models. In the Arrow–Debreu model, each production vector (schedule)
lies in a specified convex set; negative coordinates represent raw materials and positive coordinates represent finished
goods. For the problem of computing the equilibrium prices, the classic work of Eisenberg and Gale [9] gave a convex
program for computing equilibrium prices for Fisher’s model for the case of linear utility functions. For the production
model, convex programs were obtained [16,19,17,18] when the model is restricted to positive production vectors only.
An assumption of a set of raw goods outside the current market justifies this restricted model.
Over the last few years, there has been a surge of activity within the theoretical computer science community on
the question of computing equilibria [5,6,13,7,8,3,15,10,11,4,14]. Perhaps the most novel aspect of this work lies in
the development of combinatorial algorithms for these problems. Two techniques have mainly been successful: the
primal–dual schema [6] and auctions [10]. Algorithms developed using these two approaches iteratively raise prices
until equilibrium prices are found. They have been successful for models satisfying weak gross substitutability, i.e.,
raising the price of one good does not decrease the demand of another good.
Here we give an auction-based algorithm for the following case of the production model: buyers have linear utilities
for goods and producers have a single linear capacity constraint on their production schedule. As in the case of convex
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programs for the production model mentioned above, we assume that raw materials are external to the current market.
For any given prices of goods, each producer chooses a feasible schedule that maximizes his profit and each buyer
chooses a bundle of goods that maximizes her utility. The problem is to find prices such that the market clears, i.e., all
goods produced are bought and there is no deficiency of goods.
From the point of view of designing an algorithm that iteratively adjusts prices, an important difference between
the consumer models of Fisher and Walras and the production models is that in the former the amount of each good
available is fixed, while in the latter this changes with the prices of goods. So, while the algorithm is adjusting prices
to dispose of existing goods, the amounts of goods available are also changing. However, it is easy to see that our
production model (with a single constraint) satisfies weak gross substitutability in the following sense: raising the
price of a good does not decrease the demand nor increase the production of another good. As a consequence, an
algorithm that only increases prices can in principle arrive at the equilibrium. Indeed, our auction-based algorithm
never needs to decrease prices. The actions taken by the auction-based algorithm are natural and correspond to actions
performed in real markets. This is the first auction-based algorithm for such a setting.
2. The production model
Consider a market with q Producers and b Consumers, and m goods. Producer s produces zs j ≥ 0 amount of good
j and his production schedule is constrained by a linear inequality of the form (5) below, where the as j ≥ 0 and
Ks ≥ 0. The producers aim to sell the goods they produce, and they have utility for money. Consumer i has an initial
endowment of ei units of money, buys xi j ≥ 0 amount of good j , and has a linear utility function for the goods (1).
When the prices of the goods are fixed at (p j ), consumers and producers will buy and produce so as to satisfy the
following programs, termed CLP and PLP:
Maximize:
∑
1≤ j≤m
vi j xi j (1)
Subject to:
∑
1≤ j≤m
xi j p j ≤ ei (2)
∀ j : xi j ≥ 0 (3)
Maximize:
∑
1≤ j≤m
p j zs j (4)
Subject to:
∑
1≤ j≤m
zs jas j ≤ Ks (5)
∀ j : zs j ≥ 0. (6)
Defining αi as the bang-per-buck for consumer i , and γs as the profit rate for producer s, and using duality theory
we can write consumer and producer conditions for optimality as follows:
∀i : αi > 0 ⇒
∑
j
xi j p j = ei (7)
∀ j : αi p j ≥ vi j (8)
∀ j : xi j > 0 ⇒ αi p j = vi j (9)
∀i : αi ≥ 0 (10)
∀s : γs > 0 ⇒
∑
j
zs jas j = Ks (11)
∀ j : γs ≥ p j/as j (12)
∀s, j : zs j > 0 ⇒ γs = p j/as j (13)
∀s : γs ≥ 0. (14)
An equilibrium is a price vector (p j ) s.t. there are productions zs j and allocations xi j s.t. conditions ((7)–(14)) hold
and furthermore all produced goods are sold:
∀ j :
∑
i
xi j =
∑
s
zs j . (15)
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Relaxed equilibrium conditions: The output of our algorithm will satisfy (8), (10), (12) and (14) and (15) exactly,
and will satisfy the following relaxed forms of (7), (9) and (11) and (13). We will call this an -equilibrium. While the
conditions specifying the approximations for the consumers are similar to those in [10,11] the conditions specifying
the approximate equilibrium for the producers are new and it would be of interest to design algorithms which give
sharper conditions.
(7′): ∀i :∑ j xi j p j ≤ ei and∑ j xi j p j ≥ (1− )ei
(9′): ∀i, j : xi j > 0 ⇒ αi p j ≤ vi j (1+ )
(11′) ∀s :∑ j zs jas j ≤ Ks and γs >  ⇒∑ j zs jas j = Ks
(13′): ∀s, j : zs j > 0 ⇒ γs ≤ (1+ )2 p j/as j .
3. The auction algorithm
We start at very low prices p j =  × amin for all j , where amin = mins, j as j , and initialize so that no producer
produces at these prices (zs j = 0, ∀s, j , xi j = 0, ∀i, j). Note that such an initialization satisfies (11′) because at
these low prices γs < , for all producers s. Buyer i has a surplus of his initial endowment ei .
At any point during the algorithm, depending on the prices, each producer will produce a bundle of goods which
satisfies (11′), (12), (13′) and (14). We define rate(s, j) := p j/as j as the profit rate of producer s for good j . All
production will be completely bought at all times. Buyers buy good j at two different prices: at the current price p j ,
and at p j/(1 + ). We let hi j be the amount of good j bought by buyer i at p j , let yi j be that at p j/(1 + ) and let
xi j = yi j + hi j . The surplus of buyer i is ri = ei −∑ j (yi j p j/(1 + ) + hi j p j ). The total surplus is r = ∑i ri . A
buyer will only buy goods which approximately maximize his bang-per-buck (condition (9′)).
A buyer i with ri > ei tries to acquire a good j which maximizes his bang-per-buck. The auction follows the
following three steps:
1. outbid(i,k, j): This procedure will be called with a bidder k such that yk j > 0. Reduce yk j , increase hi j , return
k’s money and spend i’s money, until either yk j = 0 or ri ≤ ei .
2. producers-reschedule(i, j): If after all possible outbid(i,·, j) operations, ri > ei , then the producers will
react to i’s request for j :
(a) A producer s s.t. zs j > 0 and
∑
l zslasl < Ks : Increase the production of j and sell it to i , until either s reaches
capacity, or ri ≤ ei .
(b) A producer s s.t.
∑
l zslasl = Ks , zs j > 0, zs j ′ > 0 and p j/as j > (1 + )p j ′/as j ′ : Reduce the production of
j ′ and increase that of j while maintaining the production at capacity. Buyer i is sold the extra amount of j
and any buyer i ′ who had bought j ′ is now returned his money in exchange for the reduced production. This
continues until either zs j ′ = 0 or ri ≤ ei .
3. raise price(i, j): If after (2), ri > ei , then i will raise the price of good j by a factor of (1 + ). All profit
rates for the producers and bang-per-bucks for the buyers are recalculated. Also, the values of yi j and hi j variables
are adjusted to reflect the price rise.
This process continues until each surplus ri becomes sufficiently small (at most an  fraction of the endowment
ei ). The algorithm is outlined in detail in Figs. 1 and 2.
3.1. Correctness
It is clear that, during the algorithm, the producers produce within capacity and the buyers buy within budget.
Conditions (8), (10), (12) and (14) hold by definition. We prove that the remaining -equilibrium conditions also hold
throughout.
(9′): This holds trivially after initialization. Now buyer i is assigned a good j only if outbid(i,k, j) or
producers-reschedule(i, j) is performed. But these are performed only if αi = vi j/p j , hence (9′) continues
to hold. Producer reschedule may also disallocate some good from some player, but clearly, this does not violate (9′).
A call to raise price(·, j) raises the price of good j and one needs to prove that (9′) continues to hold. Consider two
successive calls to raise price(·, j). After the first call hk j = 0,∀k. The second call is made only when yk j = 0,∀k.
But this means that for all i s.t. hi j > 0 just before the second call to raise price, a call to outbid(i, ·, j) was made in
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algorithm main
initialize
while ∃i : ri > ei
j = argmaxl vil/pl
if ∃k : yk j > 0
outbid(i, k, j)
else
producers-reschedule(i, j)
if ri > ei //surplus remains after reschedule
raise price(i, j)
end while
end algorithm main
procedure initialize
∀ j : p j = 
∀s : γs = 0
∀i : αi = max j vi j/p j
∀i, j : xi j = 0
∀s, j : zs j = 0
end procedure initialize
procedure outbid(i, k, j)
t1 = yk j
t2 = ri/p j
t = min(t1, t2)
hi j = hi j + t
ri = ri − tp j
yk j = yk j − t
rk = rk + tp j/(1+ )
end procedure outbid;
procedure raise price(i, j)
p j = p j (1+ )
∀i ′ : yi ′ j = hi ′ j ; hi ′ j = 0
∀s : γs = maxk pk/ask //Recompute γs
∀i ′ : αi ′ = maxk vi ′k/pk //Recompute αi ′
end procedure raise price
Fig. 1. The auction algorithm.
between the two calls. A call to outbid(i, ·, j) is made only if αi = vi j/p j . The second raise price only raises p j by a
factor of (1+ ). Hence, after the second call, αi ≤ (1+ )vi j/p j , i.e., (9′) still holds.
(13′): Let rate(s, j):= p j/as j . Take any two goods j, j ′, s.t. zs j ′ > 0. It suffices to prove that rate(s, j ′) ≥ rate(s, j)
/ (1+)2. Suppose not. Consider the first time this is violated. This can only happen because of a call to raise price( j).
Since the price of j went up by a factor of (1 + ), we see that before the call rate(s, j ′) < rate(s, j) / (1 + ). But
then there should have been a producers-reschedule step in which s converts all its production of j ′ into j . This is a
contradiction.
(15): The production of any producer is changed only in producers-reschedule and this is done keeping (15) true.
Every extra amount of good produced is sold to some buyer. The buyers may also change the amount of goods they
buy in an outbid operation. Even here, the invariant is maintained.
(7′) and (11′) do not hold throughout the algorithm, but they hold upon termination. The second part of (7′) is
precisely the terminating condition, while the first part (consumers buy within their budget) always holds through the
algorithm.
(11′): Consider the first time that γs became greater than . This happened because the price of some good
j was raised, and j became the good with the maximum profit rate for s. But note that the price of a good
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procedure producers-reschedule(i, j)
//Check if some producer producing below capacity can produce good j
For s = 1 to q do:
If
∑
l asl zsl < Ks and p j/as j ≥ γs/(1+ )2
t1 = (Ks −
∑
l asl zsl )/as j //Extra amount of j producer s can produce
t2 = ri/p j // How much more does bidder i want
t = min{t1, t2}
zs j = zs j + t
hi j = hi j + t // Sell the extra production to bidder i
ri = ri − tp j
end if
end for
//Check if a producer should convert other goods to good j
For s = 1 to q do:
Let Ls := {l : zsl > 0 and p j/as j > (1+ )(pl )/asl }
t1 =
∑
l∈Ls zslasl/as j //How much of j can be produced by converting Ls to j
t2 = ri/p j // How much more does the bidder i want
t = min{t1, t2}
zs j = zs j + t
hi j = hi j + t // Sell the extra production to the bidder i
ri = ri − tp j
//Now reduce production of other goods and return money to corresponding players
For l ∈ Ls
If t > 0
tsl = min{zsl , ta j/al }
zsl = zsl − tsl
t = t − tslasl/as j
end if
end for
For l ∈ Ls
For i ′ = 1 to b
If tsl > 0
ti ′l = min{xi ′l , tsl }
xi ′l = xi ′l − ti ′l
ri ′ = ri ′ + ti ′l p˜l // This is the price at which i ′ bought l
tsl = tsl − ti ′l
end if
end for
end for
end for
end procedure producers-reschedule;
Fig. 2. The auction algorithm (contd).
is raised only if the surplus of the bidder i who raised the price of j remains significant after the procedure
producers-reschedule(i, j) is run. In this procedure every producer for whom j approximately maximizes the
profit-rate is made to produce more of j until he is producing to capacity. This means that s is producing at capacity
when the price was raised. It is clear that after the first time a producer starts producing at capacity, it will never go
below capacity, even during a producers-reschedule step.
Thus we have:
Lemma 1. On termination, the algorithm finds an -equilibrium.
3.2. Termination
It remains to prove that the algorithm indeed terminates efficiently.
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Let vmax = maxi, j vi j and vmin = mini, j vi j . We assume throughout that vmin ≥ , by possible perturbation of the
utility values.
Lemma 2. Throughout the algorithm, for all j, j ′ which are produced (to any non-zero amount), we have: p j/p j ′ ≤
(1+ )vmax/vmin.
Proof. If not, no buyer would be willing to buy any amount of j , but we have proved in the previous section that all
goods produced are sold and that consumers buy only approximately utility maximizing goods. 
Let amax = maxs, j as j , and Kmin = mins Ks .
Lemma 3. For all j , p j < Pmax := (1+ )em(amax/Kmin)(vmax/vmin).
Proof. If no producer is producing to capacity, then we are done, since the prices are at most as j , for all s, j . Else,
take any producer s who is producing to capacity Ks . Let as = max j as j . Then s produces at least one good up to at
least Ks/(mas) amount. Now the total amount of money in the system is e, hence the price of this good can be at most
emas/Ks . Since the ratio of prices of any two goods which are produced is at most (1+ )vmax/vmin (by Lemma 2),
we get the result. 
Corollary 1. The number of calls to raise price is at most m log1+(Pmax/(amin)).
In order to prove efficient convergence, we make the algorithm proceed in rounds. In a round each buyer is picked
once and the buyer reduces his surplus to 0.
Consider two successive price rises. We will first bound the number of rounds in between these price rises. Of
course, in each such round, each bidder manages to reduce his surplus to 0 without raising any prices. Pick any such
round R.
Lemma 4. The total surplus reduces by a factor of 1+  in round R.
Proof. Let ri be the surplus of buyer i , and r =∑i ri be the total surplus before the round. When it is buyer i’s turn
in this round, he will perform a series of outbid and producers-reschedule operations.
Consider an outbid(i, i ′, j) operation. Some δ amount of good j is transferred to buyer i from some other buyer
i ′. But buyer i is buying at price p j and buyer i ′ at price p j/(1 + ). So the reduction in the surplus ri of buyer i is
∆ri = δp j , and there is a net reduction in the total surplus of δp j/(1+ ) = ∆ri /(1+ ).
Consider a producers-reschedule(i, j) operation. Some producer s converts some δ amount of production of
some good j ′ to (as j ′/as j )δ amount of good j . Furthermore, s converts j ′ to j only if
p j/as j > (1+ )p j ′/as j ′ . (16)
Buyer i buys the extra amount of good j , thus reducing his surplus by ∆ri = (as j ′/as j )δp j . The δ amount of good
j ′ that is no longer produced causes some money to be returned to some other buyers. This is at most δp j ′ (it may
even be less than δp j ′ because some buyers may have bought j ′ at p j ′/(1 + )). Using (16)) we see that there is a
net reduction in the total surplus of ∆ri /(1 + ). The remaining case that a producer is producing below capacity
and produces more of good j during producers-reschedule(i, j), which is then bought by i is even simpler since
every other consumer’s surplus remains unchanged.
As buyer i reduces his surplus from ri to 0, we see that the total surplus goes down by ri/(1+ ). When buyer i is
reducing his surplus, the surplus of another buyer can only go up. So the net reduction in the surplus during the whole
round is at least (
∑
i ri )/(1+ ) = r/(1+ ). Thus the surplus at the end of the round is at most r/(1+ ). 
Let e =∑i ei , the total initial endowment.
Corollary 2. There can be at most log1+ e rounds in between two price rises.
It remains to bound the number of outbid and producers-reschedule operations in a round which does not have
a price rise. Consider player i’s turn in this round during which he reduces his surplus to 0. Since he achieves this
without raising any price, the number of outbids he performs is at most (b − 1)m and the number of producers-
reschedules he causes is at most qm (recall that b is the number of buyers, q the number of producers, and m the
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number of goods). Thus the total number of outbids and producers-reschedules performed in a round which lies in
between two price rises is at most bm(b + q).
Thus we get:
Theorem 1. The total number of operations performed by the algorithm is
O
(
bm(b + q) log1+ e log1+ Pmaxamin
)
, where Pmax = (1+ )em(amax/Kmin)(vmax/vmin).
4. Arrow–Debreu model
In this model we consider an extension of the previous model in which each agent can be a producer as well as
a consumer. There are n agents and m goods. The producer–consumer i has an initial endowment of goods denoted
by gi = {gi1, gi2 . . . gim} (we let gmin represent mini j gi j ). As a producer, each agent s can produce goods under a
production constraint (zs j is the amount of good j produced by producer s):∑
1≤ j≤m
zs jas j ≤ Ks .
As a consumer, each agent i has a linear utility function for the goods (xi j is the amount of good j bought by
consumer i):∑
1≤ j≤m
vi j xi j .
An equilibrium in this consumer–production model is a vector of prices (p j ) j=1,...,m so that the consumers and
producers satisfy the following programs (the domain of i and s is the same):
For every i , there is a consumption program:
Maximize :
∑
1≤ j≤m
vi j xi j (17)
Subject to:
∑
1≤ j≤m
xi j p j ≤
∑
1≤ j≤m
gi j p j +
∑
1≤ j≤m
zi j p j (18)
∀ j : xi j ≥ 0. (19)
For every s, there is a production program:
Maximize :
∑
1≤ j≤m
p j zs j (20)
Subject to:
∑
1≤ j≤m
zs jas j ≤ Ks (21)
∀ j : zs j ≥ 0. (22)
There is also the global constraint on total number of goods:∑
1≤i≤n
xi j ≤
∑
1≤i≤m
gi j +
∑
1≤s≤n
zs j . (23)
Assigning dual variables, αi (termed bang-per-buck) for the consumer i , and γs (termed profit-rate) for producer s,
and using duality theory we can write conditions for optimality as follows:
∀i : αi > 0 ⇒
∑
1≤ j≤m
xi j p j =
∑
1≤ j≤m
gi j p j +
∑
1≤ j≤m
zi j p j (24)
∀ j : αi p j ≥ vi j (25)
∀ j : xi j > 0 ⇒ αi p j = vi j (26)
∀i : αi ≥ 0 (27)
∀ s : γs > 0 ⇒
∑
j
zs jas j = Ks (28)
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algorithm main
initialize
while ∃p j = 1 and ∃i : ri > gmin/n(1+ )
j = argmaxl vil/pl
if
∑n
k=1 xk j <
∑
s(gs j + zs j ) then assign(i, j)
else if ∃k : yk j > 0
outbid(i, k, j)
else
producers-reschedule(i, j)
if ri > ei //surplus remains after reschedule
raise price( j)
end while
end algorithm main
procedure initialize
∀ j : p j = 1
∀s : γs = maxk pk/ask //Compute γs∀i : αi = max j vi j/p j
∀i, j : xi j = 0
∀s : set z¯s to optimize production LP
∀s, i : ri =
∑
j (zi j + gi j )p j end procedure initialize
procedure assign(i, j)
t = min(g j + z j −
∑n
k=1 xk j ,
ri
p j
)
hi j = hi j + t
ri = ri − tp j
end procedure assign;
procedure outbid(i, k, j)
t1 = yk j
t2 = ri/p j
t = min(t1, t2)
hi j = hi j + t
ri = ri − tp j
yk j = yk j − t
rk = rk + tp j/(1+ )
end procedure outbid;
procedure raise price( j)
p j = p j (1+ )
∀i ′ : yi ′ j = hi ′ j ; hi ′ j = 0
∀s : γs = maxk pk/ask //Recompute γs
∀i ′ : αi ′ = maxk vi ′k/pk //Recompute αi ′∀i : ri = ri + gi j p j/(1+ )
end procedure raise price
Fig. 3. The auction algorithm.
∀ j : γs ≥ p j/as j (29)
∀ j : zs j > 0 ⇒ γs = p j/as j (30)
∀s : γs ≥ 0 (31)∑
1≤i≤n
xi j =
∑
1≤i≤m
gi j +
∑
1≤s≤n
zs j . (32)
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procedure producers-reschedule(i, j)
//Check if a producer should convert other goods to good j
For s = 1 to n do:
Let Ls := {l : zsl > 0 and p j/as j > (1+ )(pl )/asl }
t1 =
∑
l∈Ls zslasl/as j //How much of j can be produced by converting Ls to j
t2 = ri/p j // how much more does the consumer i want
t = min{t1, t2}
zs j = zs j + t
hi j = hi j + t // Sell the extra production to the consumer i
ri = ri − tp j
rs = rs + tp j
//Now reduce production of other goods and return money to corresponding players
For l ∈ Ls
If t > 0
tsl = min{zsl , ta j/al }
zsl = zsl − tsl
t = t − tslasl/as j
end if
end for
For l ∈ Ls
For i ′ = 1 to n
If tsl > 0
ti ′l = min{xi ′l , tsl }
xi ′l = xi ′l − ti ′l
ri ′ = ri ′ + ti ′l p˜l // this is the price at which i ′ bought l
rs = rs − ti ′l p˜l
tsl = tsl − ti ′l
end if
end for
end for
end for
end procedure producers-reschedule;
Fig. 4. The auction algorithm (contd).
In Section 4.2, we will show how to relax conditions (24), (26), (30) and (32), to define an -equilibrium. The algorithm
in the following section computes such an -equilibrium.
4.1. The algorithm
The algorithm is similar to the algorithm in the Fisher model, with a few differences. The algorithm is outlined in
detail in Figs. 3 and 4. Throughout, an agent will be referred to as a producer or a consumer depending on the context
and the role he plays.
Initially all items are priced at unity, unlike in the Fisher case (in which prices started very low). Given these
prices, an optimal production schedule is computed for each producer (solving the production program optimally).
The endowment of the consumers is now computed based on the amount of goods produced and available initially,
i.e., for each i : ei = ∑ j pi j (zi j + gi j ). The consumers bid for goods based on their utility and acquire the goods
available.
Agents will buy good j at two prices, p j , the current price, and p j/(1 + ). We let hi j (resp. yi j ) be the amount
of good j that consumer i buys at the higher (resp. lower) price. At the kth iteration, which we term as a consumption
phase, consider a consumer i with surplus ri . The set of goods which maximize vi j/p j , termed the demand set of
consumer i , is computed. One of the following events can occur:
– Consumer i acquires a good j in its demand set by an assign operation in which it buys at current price some
amount of good j which is produced or is in initial bundles, but is not yet bought.
– Consumer i acquires a good j in its demand set by an outbid procedure wherein he outbids another buyer of the
good j (one who has bought good j at price p j/(1+ )).
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– If consumer i still has surplus money but good j is not available to be bought or to be obtained by outbidding
other consumers, then we go to a producers-reschedule step. In this, a producer s who has good j as
the most profitable good (maximizing p j/as j ) transfers the production of other goods to good j in order
to exhaust the surplus of consumer i . The producers are considered in round robin order. Note that if the
producer i itself has good j as maximizing vs j/p j , i.e., in its demand set, then all its production can be
allocated to j .
– If none of the above apply then the consumer i raises the price of item j with maximum value of vi j/p j by a factor
of (1+ ).
The algorithm terminates when the price of all items rises above 1 (which, we will show, is also the case when
all goods, produced and initial, are allocated) or when the surplus money at each agent is less than gmin/n
(1+ ).
4.2. Correctness
As in the case of the Fisher model, we show that the following relaxed versions of the equilibrium conditions (26)
and (30), as well as condition (28), hold as invariants during the algorithm. Furthermore, Lemma 5 shows that, at
termination, relaxed versions of conditions (24) and (32) also hold.
Invariant 1: vi j ≤ αi p j and xi j > 0 ⇒ vi j ≤ αi p j ≤ vi j (1+ ).
Invariant 2: (p j/as j ) ≤ γs and zs j > 0 ⇒ (p j/as j ) ≥ γs/(1+ )2.
Invariant 3:
∑
1≤ j≤m zs jas j = Ks .
Invariant 1 holds due to the fact that each consumer is acquiring goods that maximize his bang-per-buck within a
factor of (1+ ).
Invariant 2 holds because each producer produces goods which are close to optimal in terms of profit-rate (p j/as j ).
That this holds throughout the algorithm can be shown by an analysis similar to the one in the analysis of the Fisher
algorithm in the previous section — the producer converts the production of all (1+ )-suboptimal goods to optimal
goods, before the price of an optimal good is increased by some consumer.
Invariant 3 holds because we initialize production to start at full capacity and never go below capacity, even during
a producers-reschedule step.
Lemma 5. At termination
Fact 1:
∀ j : 1
1+ 
( ∑
1≤i≤n
gi j +
∑
1≤s≤n
zs j
)
≤
∑
1≤i≤n
xi j ≤
( ∑
1≤i≤n
gi j +
∑
1≤s≤n
zs j
)
Fact 2:
1
1+ 
∑
i
( ∑
1≤ j≤m
gi j p j +
∑
1≤ j≤m
zi j p j
)
≤
∑
i
∑
1≤ j≤m
xi j p j
≤
∑
i
∑
1≤ j≤m
gi j p j +
∑
1≤ j≤m
zi j p j .
Proof. This follows from an analysis similar to that in [10], which we provide here for completeness. Fact 2 follows
from Fact 1 by multiplying by p j and summing over the goods. Hence it suffices to prove Fact 1. There are two
possible conditions for termination. In the first case, termination occurs because the price of every good is greater
than 1. Now, in the algorithm, the price of a good is raised only if there is no more amount of the good available to be
bought at that time. We ensure that this invariant holds even after the first time the price is raised. During the algorithm
the good may be rescheduled in producers-reschedule when the price is profitable for a producer. The algorithm
ensures that only so much amount is rescheduled as is demanded and bought. Also any amount of production that is
decreased by a producer is bought back from the consumers at the correct price. Thus Fact 1 is satisfied in the first
case.
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Now consider the case that termination has taken place with the condition that for every consumer the residual
money ri ≤ gmin/n(1 + ). Recall that yi j is the amount of good j bought by consumer i at the price p j/(1 + ),
where p j is the current price of the good. Then∑
i
ri =
∑
i
∑
j
(gi j + zi j − xi j )p j + 1+ 
∑
i
∑
j
yi j p j ≤ 1+  gmin.
Since for all i, j , we have yi j ≥ 0, p j ≥ 1, and∑i (gi j + zi j − xi j ) ≥ 0, we have:
∀ j :
∑
i
(gi j + zi j − xi j ) ≤ 1+  gmin
⇒ ∀ j :
∑
i (gi j + zi j )
1+  ≤
∑
i
xi j .
This proves Fact 1, in this case too. 
Fact 1 in the previous lemma shows that a relaxed version of equilibrium condition (32) holds on termination.
Also, noting that no consumer goes above budget, we see that Fact 2 implies that a relaxed version of condition (24)
also holds on termination. We have thus achieved an approximate market equilibrium where conditions (24)–(32) are
approximately satisfied.
4.3. Complexity
To prove termination note that the price rises are bounded by the ratio of the largest utility to the smallest, since the
algorithm terminates as soon as the price of the last item rises above 1.
Lemma 6. p j ≤ (1+ )vmax/vmin.
To simplify the analysis, we assume for simplicity that the producers are consumers of only money, i.e., they have
a valuation only on their money. We thus introduce for every producer s a good gs corresponding to money that he
values (for ease of analysis we introduce a separate good for each producer, corresponding to money, rather than one
single good that corresponds to money). The producer s has a utility only for gs . One can take this utility value to be
the total money that all the goods endowed and produced by this producer could be sold for, which is ( Ksas +mgs)Pmax.
Here as is the minimum coefficient in the producer’s LP, gs is the maximum endowment of this agent, and Pmax is
the maximum price of a good, as shown in the previous lemma. Further, there is a consumer Cs corresponding to the
producer s who possesses a unit of the good gs as the initial endowment. The consumer Cs has the same valuation for
the goods that the producer had originally. This gadget ensures that the money gained by the producer, via either sale
of his endowment or by producing goods, is spent on gs and consequently raises the endowment money available to
Cs . Cs can now spend this money on the good that the producer values and would have acquired. Thus any market
clearing solution obtained in the original model is also a market clearing solution in the modified model and vice
versa.
The algorithm can be explicitly modified so that whenever a producer, say s, has a surplus it spends it on gs .
During the course of the algorithm prices rise. Consider a consumption phase between any two price rises,
irrespective of the good at which the price rise occurs. Each such consumption phase is composed of rounds. In every
round, each of the consumers exhausts his surplus at least once (else there is a price rise). However, as producers
change their production schedule to goods which are in demand and more profitable to produce, their surplus or
endowment also rises. Let j be a good whose price has risen and which is in demand. In a round (where every buyer
is considered once) producers would be induced to change to this good. Consider a buyer i who demands good j . Part
of the surplus of buyer i goes towards acquiring j from some other buyer i ′ and the remaining goes to a producer s
who shifts his production from some good j ′, thus generating surplus at some buyer i ′′. Note that the producer also
increases his surplus/endowment value when he shifts his production. The surplus at buyers i and i ′′ is reduced by a
factor of (1 + ) due to the higher price of acquisition of good j . The surplus at the producer, say s, is spent on the
good gs , and reduces to zero at every round. There is thus a reduction in the surplus as determined in Lemma 4. Note
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that if there is sufficient increase in the surplus of the producer then the price of the good corresponding to producer s,
gs , increases. Else the total surplus simply reduces by a factor of (1 + ). We thus have the following lemma similar
to Lemma 4:
Lemma 7. In round R, either there is a price rise or the total surplus reduces by a factor of 1+ .
By an analysis similar to that in [10] we get a polynomial bound on the complexity:
Theorem 2. An approximate equilibrium in the Arrow–Debreu producer model can be determined in
O(2mn2 log1+ Pmax log1+((g + K )Pmax/gmin)) where Pmax = (1 + )(vmax/vmin) is the maximum price
achievable, K = ∑s Ks , g = ∑mj=1 g j , gmin is the smallest size of the initial endowment and vmax (vmin) is the
largest (smallest) utility.
Proof. The procedure raise price can increase the value of r . The maximum possible value of surplus r is
(g + K )pmax where g =∑mj=1 g j , K =∑s Ks , or the maximum amount of revenue available. When the algorithm
terminates the total surplus becomes less than 
(1+)gmin. Therefore, the maximum number of rounds between two
successive calls to raise price is bounded by O( 1

log( (g+K )pmax
gmin
)). The number of times raise price is called is
bounded by O( 1

m log pmax). Similar to the argument in the previous section, the number of outbids and producers-
reschedules performed in a round between two price bounds is at most 2mn2. This gives the required bound. 
Note: A reduction from the Fisher case of our production model (with a single production constraint) to the Fisher
case without production has been recently provided in [12].
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